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LIFE IS BETTER IN THE LAND DOWN UNDER: 
AUSTRALIAN TREATMENT OF GM 
CONTAMINATION AND WHY IT SHOULD  
BE FOLLOWED IN THE UNITED STATES 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Monsanto introduced the herbicide-tolerant Roundup Ready 
soybean. Since then, the growth and production of genetically modified 
(“GM”) food in the United States has remained a controversial topic.1 
Although GM crops have been widely adopted by farmers in the United 
States,
2
 many private citizens and lawmakers remain unconvinced of their 
safety.
3
 This combination of widespread adoption and public concern is 
 
 
 1. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS (2005), available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfsmonsantovsfarmerreport11305.pdf (outlining the rise of 
Monsanto GM products and the legal battles that have taken place through 2005); Marian Burros, 
Shoppers Unaware of Gene Changes, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1998, at A8; Jimmy Carter, Op-Ed., Who’s 
Afraid of Genetic Engineering?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at A21; Barnaby J. Feder, As Science 
Gathers Speed, Monsanto Leads Pack: Biotechnology Is Set to Hatch, Led by Monsanto, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 1998, at D1; Bill Lambrecht, Biotechnology Foes From Around the World Plan New Tactics to 
Tout Cause; Protesters Who Met Here Target Monsanto Projects, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 20, 
1998, at B4; Mike Toner, Consumers Not Concerned About Genetic Tinkering, ATL. J. & CONST., May 
14, 1995, at 4N. 
 2. In 2003, 84% of canola acreage in the United States was made up of GM crops. CTR. FOR 
FOOD SAFETY, supra note 1, at 8–9. By 2004, 85% of US soy acreage, 45% of corn acreage, and 76% 
of all cotton acreage was made up of GM crops, produced by a variety of companies, including 
Monsanto. Id.  
 3. Several advocacy groups, including Greenpeace, have publicly opposed GM foods. Genetic 
Engineering, GREENPEACE INT’L, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/agriculture/ 
problem/genetic-engineering/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). In 2014, legislation was passed in Vermont 
that requires the labeling of all GM food. Peter Moskowitz, In GMO Labeling Fight, All Eyes on 
Vermont, AL JAZEERA AM. (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/1/ 
in-gmo-labeling-fightalleyesonvermont.html. Similar labeling initiatives were narrowly rejected by 
voters in Washington and Oregon in 2013 and 2014 respectively. Amrutha Gayathri, Initiative 552: 
Washington State Throws Out GM Food Labeling Measure, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:48 
AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/initiative-522-washington-state-throws-out-gm-food-labeling-measure-
1457318 (noting that the Washington initiative failed by a vote of 54.8% opposed to 45.2% in favor of 
labeling); Tracy Loew, Oregon GMO Labeling Campaign Admits Defeat, USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2014, 
8:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/11/oregon-gmo-labeling-campaign-
admits-defeat/20275987/ (noting that the Oregon initiative failed to pass by a margin of 837 votes). In 
2013, advocates secured the passage of a ban on the growth and use of GM crops on the Hawaiian 
islands of Kauai and Maui. Jacob Bunge, U.S. Judge Overturns GMO Crop Curbs in Hawaii, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2014, 8:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-judge-overturns-gmo-crop-curbs-in-
hawaii-1409009260 (explaining that the Kauai ban was adopted in late 2013 but was later struck down 
on the grounds of state law preemption); Anita Hofschneider, 1,000 Votes: Maui GMO Farming Ban 
Squeaks By, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.civilbeat.com/2014/11/1000-votes-
maui-gmo-farming-ban-squeaks-by/. All of these instances are indicative of an underlying distrust of 
GM foods and products by the American public. 
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one factor contributing to the growth and expansion of organic farming in 
the United States.
4
 One major concern for organic farmers is the 
possibility of crop contamination by neighboring GM crops.
5
 Many 
commentators have suggested that US law remains underdeveloped and 
fails to provide uniform remedies for organic farmers who might 
experience any number of contamination events.
6
 Some recently published 
articles have examined the common law claims of nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence and concluded that these claims fail to provide sufficient 
remedies for farmers.
7
 However, this Note concludes, by relying on the 
recently decided Australian case Marsh v. Baxter,
8
 that organic farmers 
may find adequate protection within current US common law. Therefore, 
further statutory revisions are completely unnecessary to protect the US 
agricultural industry. 
This Note proceeds in four parts, arguing that current US law has the 
ability to efficiently remedy any damages resulting from GM 
contamination of organic crops. Part I provides background on organic 
agriculture in the United States and examines the current fear of 
contamination of organic crops by their GM counterparts. Part II looks at 
 
 
 4. See Dan Flynn, Report: Organic Food Industry Achieved 25 Years of Fast Growth Through 
Fear and Deception, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/04/ 
report-fast-growing-organics-industry-is-intentionally-deceptive/#.VLm5uorF8mU. 
 5. See Carey Gillam, Organic Farm Supporters Say GMO Contamination Needs USDA 
Controls, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/usa-gmo-
contamination-report-idUSL1N0LX1OU20140303 (noting one survey of farmers reported that up to 
30 percent of farmers who seek to grow organic crops found or suspected unintended GMO presence 
on their farms); Survey: Organic Farmers Pay the Price for GMO Contamination, FOOD AND WATER 
WATCH (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/survey-organic-farmers-pay-price-
gmo-contamination (discussing the financial repercussions of GM contamination and the problems 
facing organic farmers seeking to coexist with GM crops). 
 6. See, e.g., A. Bryan Endres & Lisa Schlessinger, Pollen Drift: Reframing the Biotechnology 
Liability Debate, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 815, 848 (2014) (“[U]nder the current tort regime, there is no 
predictable protection or redress for an organic farmer to shield their investment and livelihood should 
a GM farmer start farming on neighboring land.”); Shené Mitchell, Organic Crops, Genetic Drift, and 
Commingling: Theories of Remedy and Defense, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 313, 332 (2013) (“Until 
Congress sees fit to overlay a federal scheme for common law property claims . . . organic farmers 
cannot widely depend on these traditional arguments to protect their investments.”).  
 7.  These authors suggest that statutory revisions be made to establish efficient liability rules, 
such as the implementation of a federal scheme, state adoption of a uniform methodology for 
addressing GM contamination, or the implementation of coexistence regulations. The suggested 
affirmative defense would protect farmers from being held liable for breaches of IP law in the case of 
unintentional genetic drift. Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 6, at 853–57; Mitchell, supra note 6, at 
320–21, 331–33. See also Adam W. Jones, Note, What Liability of Growing Genetically Engineered 
Crops?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 621, 643–44 (2002) (concluding that an alternative regulatory system is 
necessary to protect organic farmers). 
 8. [2014] WASC 187 (Austl.), available at http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/supdcsn. 
nsf/PDFJudgments-WebVw/2014WASC0187/%24FILE/2014WASC0187.pdf. 
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the unsatisfactory precedent that exists in the United States and argues that 
state-controlled tort claims can provide farmers with satisfactory recovery. 
Part II.A provides background on the current state of federal regulation of 
GM crops in the United States, which provides no recovery for 
contamitated farmers. Part II.B, through analysis of the leading GM 
contamination case in the United States, In re StarLink Corn Products 
Liability Litigation,
9
 shows why the state remedies currently available to 
organic farmers provide for full recovery, especially the tort claim of 
private nuisance.   
Part III looks to Australian regulation and its recent handling of 
contamination cases in order to hightlight the strengths of the US common 
law system currently available to contaminated farmers. Part III.A 
discusses current Australian regulation of both GM and organic products, 
which is remarkably similar to the US system, thus allowing the drawing 
of useful parallels. Part III.B then presents the recently decided Marsh v. 
Baxter, which dealt with a private claim for recovery following alleged 
GM contamination of organic crops. Marsh shows that a farmer facing 
GM contamination can rely on common law tort claims in order to recover 
for economic losses. Even though the plaintiff-farmer Marsh had his 
claims dismissed by the Australian court, the case gives meaningful 
insight into possible routes for recovery in the case of actual 
contamination.  
Finally, Part IV provides a discussion of the Marsh decision against the 
background of existing US precedent, including StarLink. This Note 
concludes that existing state and federal law can provide reasonable and 
fair relief for a farmer—organic or conventional—who experiences GM 
contamination. Additional statutory revisions would only further 
complicate the system, potentially placing burdens on GM farmers and 
upsetting the balance of the entire agriculture industry. Organic farmers 
seeking recovery can find satisfactory relief through a dual system of 
common law claims of private nuisance against contaminating parties and 
contract claims against non-governmental certifying organizations for 
wrongful decertification. This system allows for the most productive use 
of farmland in the United States while simultaneously protecting farmers 
from any actual damage caused by contamination.   
 
 
 9. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
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I. ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
An investigation into the possible avenues of recovery available to 
organic farmers facing a contamination event is important given the recent 
growth of the organic market and the pervasive fear of contamination 
within the organic agriculture industry.
10
 Between 2000 and 2012, sales of 
organic food products in the United States grew an average of fifteen 
percent annually.
11
 As of 2008, over 4.1 million acres in the United States 
alone were devoted to organic production.
12
 Organic food products are 
now available in three out of every four conventional stores in the United 
States and make up over four percent of total US food sales annually.
13
 
With consumer interest in organic foods rising annually,
14
 the health of 
this industry is an important and worthwhile topic of study. 
Contamination of organic foods can occur in a variety of ways. Not 
only can the introduction of GM material cause contamination, but the 
exposure of crops to pesticides or fungicides not approved for use on 
certified organic products may constitute contamination.
15
 GM 
contamination occurs when GM material is introduced into a non-GM 
 
 
 10. Recently, some farmers have pushed for further regulation of GM crops over fears that 
coexistence is not possible without widespread genetic drift. See Carey L. Biron, U.S. Farmers Report 
Widespread GM Crop Contamination, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/03/farmers-address-u-s-data-gap-gm-crop-contamination/. Studies have 
shown that food sales represent over ninety-two percent of the organic sales in the United States. See J. 
D. Heyes, Record Growth of Organic Food Consumption in the U.S. and India, NATURAL NEWS (July 
27, 2014), http://www.naturalnews.com/046188_organic_food_consumption_record_growth_internati 
onal_markets.html. 
 11. Organic Food Sales Growth in the United States from 2000 to 2012, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/196962/organic-food-sales-growth-in-the-us-since-2000/ (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2015). In 2013, the value of the organic food market exceeded $35 billion, which represented 
a twelve percent increase over the previous year. Heyes, supra note 10.  
 12. Marsha Laux, Organic Food Trends Profile, AGRIC. MKTG. RES. CTR., http://www.agmrc. 
org/markets__industries/food/organic-food-trends-profile/ (last updated Nov. 2013). 
 13. Organic Market Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-
resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-overview.aspx (last updated Apr. 7, 2014). 
 14. “National surveys conducted by the Hartman Group and Food Marketing Institute during the 
early 2000s found that two-thirds of surveyed shoppers bought organically grown foods.” Id. 
 15. Farmers can experience contamination when chemicals sprayed over conventional or GM 
crops drift through the air and land on organic crops or grazing land. See JIM RIDDLE, UNIV. OF MINN., 
GMO CONTAMINATION PREVENTION: WHAT DOES IT TAKE? 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.extension.umn.edu/garden/master-gardener/volunteers/teaching-tools/docs/minimizing_gmo_ 
contamination.pdf. Even farmers who have established windbreaks or hedgerows to prevent drift 
cannot completely protect themselves from overspray. Id. Recent studies have found that nearly fifty 
percent of all organic produce in Canada has been contaminated with pesticides. Joanne Levasseur & 
Vera-Lynn Kubinec, Pesticide Residue Found on Nearly Half of Organic Produce, CBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 
2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/pesticide-residue-found-on-nearly-half-of-
organic-produce-1.2487712. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/9
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food source. This can occur when particles of GM crops are mixed with 
those of non-GM crops after harvest or through cross-breeding in the field 
prior to harvest. For example, the use of rented farm equipment on organic 
crops following their use in the harvest of GM crops can introduce enough 
GM material to warrant decertification of the harvested organic products.
16
 
Additionally, there are several avenues for GM genes or plants to 
introduce themselves into an organic crop, including wind-driven pollen 
drift,
17
 the movement of cut plant matter leading to ‘volunteers,’18 and 
animal transportation of seeds and other genetic material.
19
 
While contamination events are not unique to organic producers and 
handlers,
20
 such events can arguably have a much larger impact on the 
organic food industry due to a number of unique factors. Organic produce 
is generally sold in the marketplace for a sizable premium over both 
conventional and GM produce.
21
 This premium helps farmers offset the 
 
 
 16. See RIDDLE, supra note 15, at 5. 
 17. See id. at 3. See also R.L. Nielson, Minimizing Pollen Drift & Commingling of GMO and 
non-GMO Corn Grain, PURDUE UNIV. (Mar. 7, 2000), available at http://www.agry.purdue.edu/ext/ 
corn/news/articles.00/gmo_issues-000307.html. 
 18. Volunteers are plants that grow without being deliberately planted, whether from dormant 
seeds left from previous harvests or from migrating seeds. In the 2014 decision of Marsh v. Baxter, 
swaths of canola plants were moved via wind into an organically-certified, non-canola field. This 
incursion led to numerous GM volunteers establishing themselves. Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187, 
at 29 (Austl.). While this incursion of GM material might be considered a contamination event, had the 
GM canola volunteers invaded an organic canola field, cross pollination could have led to a much 
more destructive contamination. 
 19. The Marsh court noted that viable non-GM seeds were transported by wild rabbits a 
considerable distance from one farmer’s field into organic-certified farmland. Id. at 91. It is also well 
established that birds can play a role in transporting viable seeds over extremely large areas. See, e.g., 
Liba Pejchar et al., Birds as Agents of Seed Dispersal in a Human-Dominated Landscape in Southern 
Costa Rica, 141 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 536 (2008), available at https://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/ 
~ranganathan/publications/pejchar%20et%20al%202008,%20biological%20conservation.pdf. 
 20. Theoretically, crops or products may be non-GM and also non-organic. Organic refers to the 
process used to grow and process crops in the absence of synthetic or GM materials. See infra notes 
34–37 and accompanying text. Non-GM, on the other hand, refers only to the absence of genetically 
modified material. Amy Levine, The Difference Between USDA Organic and Non-GMO Verified Seal, 
BOS. ORGANICS (Oct. 24, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://blog.bostonorganics.com/wordpress/2013/10/24/ 
avoid-gmos-the-difference-between-organic-and-non-gmo-labels. The status of these non-GM 
products, similar to that of organic products, could be placed in jeopardy by the introduction of GM 
material. 
 21. The USDA provides detailed organic price tables based on research provided by the 
Agriculture Marketing Service (“AMS”) Market News to show monthly and annual pricing for a 
number of major commodities. Organic Prices, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/organic-prices.aspx (last updated Aug. 28, 2014). These tables show that both organic 
vegetables and organic fruit were sold at a healthy premium in Atlanta and San Francisco. Wholesale 
Vegetable Prices, Organic and Conventional, Monthly and Annual, 2012–13, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/organic-prices.aspx (last updated Aug. 28, 2014). 
For example, in 2012, cartons of organic romaine lettuce sold for an average of $22.95 more than their 
conventional counterparts in Atlanta. Id. This premium was $14.16 in San Francisco. Id. These 
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increased cost of production that is required by some organic crops.
22
 Even 
when the costs of growing organic crops are equivalent to those of similar 
GM crops, organic farmers expect to receive a premium for their efforts.
23
 
While regulation and certification is covered in depth in Part II.A, it 
should be stated here that a contamination event could lead to 
decertification of organic produce and organic farmland. This 
decertification could force organic farmers to sell produce for a lower 
price, effectively erasing any expected profit for that growing season and 
beyond.
24
  
Therefore, in order to ensure the health and continued success of the 
organic food industry, organic farmers must have efficient and satisfactory 
legal avenues for recovering damages following a contamination event.
25
 
However, as GM products are grown on 169 million acres of land in the 
United States and make up a large portion of the US food supply, any 
recovery must avoid placing an unnecessary burden on GM producers.
26
 
As this Note argues, satisfactory avenues already exist in the current tort 
 
 
premiums for organic produce, while not completely static, remained relatively constant over the 
entirety of 2012. Id.  
 22. See generally Karen Klonsky, Comparison of Production Costs and Resource Use for 
Organic and Conventional Production Systems, 94 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 314, 319–21 (2012). 
 23. One researcher found that weed, pest, and disease management costs for some organic crops 
were actually lower than their conventional counterparts. Id. at 319. For example, while $1627 was 
spent per conventional acre of lettuce grown, only $1258 was spent per acre of organic lettuce. Id. 
Importantly, a number of different calculations are required in determining the total cost of producing 
any crop, including total cost of disease and pest management, labor costs, fuel costs, and water use. 
Id. at 315, 320. Additionally, organic crops tend to have lower yield expectancies than their 
conventional and GM counterparts. Id. at 318. Some research shows that, even with lower yields, 
organic corn has a much higher profit per acre than GM corn. See Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 
6, at 823–24. 
 24. Producers may face future lost profits for up to three years following contamination due to 
federal and private party regulations for organic certification. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 25. Given recent fears regarding contamination of organic crops by GM or other sources, it is 
important that organic producers not only actually have an avenue for relief, but also that they 
subjectively believe that this avenue is satisfactory and efficient. This subjective belief is paramount in 
order to ensure that organic producers will continue to invest in their organic endeavors and therefore 
contribute to the continued health of the organic food industry. For insight into the current mindset of 
some organic farmers, see Shicana Allen, Crop Contamination Takes its Toll on non-GM and Organic 
Farmers, INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH. (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.responsibletechnology.org/posts/ 
crop-contamination-takes-its-toll/; Press Release, Food and Water Watch, Survey: Organic Farmers 
Pay the Price for GMO Contamination (Mar. 3, 2014), available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch. 
org/pressreleases/survey-organic-farmers-pay-the-price-for-gmo-contamination/. 
 26. JOSE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 
CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2014), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-
economic-research-report/err162.aspx. This number accounts for over half of the total area used to 
grow crops in the United States. Id. Compare that with the 4.1 million acres devoted to organic crops 
in 2008. Marsha Laux, Organic Food Trends Profile, AGRIC. MKTG. RES. CTR., http://www.agmrc. 
org/markets__industries/food/organic-food-trends-profile/ (last updated Nov. 2013).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/9
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and contract law of the United States that strike a healthy balance between 
GM and organic farmers. 
II. STARLINK AND THE STATE OF US LAW 
In the United States, the federal government has established a 
complicated system that regulates the growth and labeling of organic and 
GM products.  However, these regulations do not establish liability for 
contamination events. This is left to the common law systems of 
individual states. Importantly, while the intent element required for many 
common law tort claims creates barriers to recovery when applied to cases 
of GM contamination, private nuisance appears to provide an avenue of 
relief. In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation provides limited 
insight into the applicability of these state law claims to a case of 
widespread GM contamination. Unfortunately, both StarLink and 
analogous non-GM contamination cases serve as insufficient predictors of 
recovery for organic farmers facing GM contamination. Therefore, 
questions remain in the United States as to the applicability of tort claims 
to GM contamination. 
A. US Regulation of GM and Organic Agriculture 
In the United States, various state and federal agencies regulate GM 
agriculture and GM food products. Under a policy set out in the 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology in 1986, the 
USDA, the FDA, and the EPA assess and regulate genetically modified 
organisms (“GMOs”), including GM crops.27 The involvement and scope 
of regulation by each agency is dependent upon the intended use of the 
plant.
28
 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), an 
agency within the USDA, regulates and monitors the risk that a GMO may 
become a weed or another risk to plant health.
29
 The FDA, in regulating 
the safety of food and food products from plant sources, ensures that GM 
plants meet the same standards as traditionally-bred plants.
30
 The EPA 
 
 
 27. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 
1986). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Authority is given to the USDA through the Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7786 
(2013), and agency regulations under Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 
(2015). For an overview of the USDA program and management of GMOs, including GM crops, see 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/ 
portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology (last visited Sept. 16, 2015). 
 30. The FDA regulates most food under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regulates GMOs with pesticide properties under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”)31 and the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetics Act (“FFDCA”).32 While these laws do not establish 
specific remedies for farmers experiencing GM contamination, the 
regulatory power of the federal government may establish some instances 
of liability for producers and growers of GM crops, as illustrated by 
StarLink.
33
 
The federal government also regulates organic agriculture and 
products. Modern regulation of organic food production and labeling in 
the United States began with the passage of the Organic Foods Production 
Act of 1990.
34
 This statute established the National Organic Program 
(“NOP”), which sets minimum standards for all producers or handling 
operations that intend to “sell, label, or represent agricultural products” as 
“organic.”35 The NOP covers land management, nutrient management 
standards, weed and pest control, and seed and planting stock standards.
36
 
It also prohibits the use of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides that contain 
synthetic materials, and GM seeds.
37
 While the NOP establishes certain 
minimum standards, the certification process is carried out by accredited 
third-party certifiers.
38
 Additionally, the NOP minimum standards can be 
raised and fully supplanted by local and state certification requirements or 
 
 
§§ 301–399f (2013) (“FFDCA”). The FDA has established a voluntary consultation process for 
developers of GMOs to help ensure the safety of these products. FDA’s Role in Regulating Safety of 
GE Foods, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ 
ucm352067.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2015). For more information on FDA regulation of GM 
products and their role in the larger regulatory framework, see Questions & Answers on Food from 
Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/Food 
ScienceResearch/Biotechnology/ucm346030.htm (last updated Jun. 22, 2015).  
 31. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2013). 
 32. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f. For further discussion of federal regulation of GM products, see also 
EPA’s Regulation of Biotechnology for Use in Pest Management, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/biopesticides/reg_of_biotech/eparegofbiotech.htm (last updated May 
14, 2014). 
 33. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 34. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 (2013). 
 35. National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.200 (2015). 
 36. Id. §§ 205.202–.206. 
 37. Id. The NOP provides very limited exemptions to these strict standards for producers who 
sell less than $5000 worth of agricultural products per year. Id. § 205.101. 
 38. There are currently eighty USDA certifying agents, forty-eight of which reside in the United 
States. Accredited Certifying Agents, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://preprod.ams.usda.gov/services/ 
organic-certification/certifying-agents (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). The certification process requires 
that farms or handling facilities provide a wide range of information, including a description of the 
facility seeking certification, a history of land use over the previous three years, a list of organic 
products raised or handled, and a written “Organic Systems Plan” detailing the practices and 
substances used. FAQ: Becoming a Certified Operation, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ams. 
usda.gov/AMSv1.0/NOPFAQsHowCertified (last modified Jan. 28, 2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/9
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by requirements set by the third-party certifiers.
39
 Regarding organic 
contamination by GM material, NOP standards do not require 
decertification of organic producers who have a detectible amount of GM 
contamination. These rules were intended to be “process based.”40 
Therefore, as long as producers do not use prohibited methods and take 
“reasonable steps” to avoid contamination, the unintentional presence of 
prohibited materials “should not affect the status of an organic product or 
operation.”41 No private organization, however, will currently certify a 
crop in the United States that contains any detectible level of 
contamination.
42
 
While the federal government regulates the production and sale of both 
GM and organic products, it has not established remedies for the 
contamination of organic crops by GM materials. To date, the USDA, 
FDA, and EPA have all uniformly held that liability for damage resulting 
from GM contamination is a state issue, not a federal one.
43
 The FDA does 
not differentiate between GM and non-GM crops in the enforcement of its 
food safety regulations.
44
 Furthermore, NOP standards promulgated by the 
USDA do not establish liability for either contamination events or any 
resulting decertification.
45
 The NOP rules only regulate the organic 
certification of crops and products.
46
 Therefore, the standards do nothing 
to regulate the activities of non-organic farmers growing GM products.
47
 
This leaves non-GM farmers who experience GM contamination reliant 
upon state law for remedies to any damages that may occur. While some 
commentators have suggested that such a result leaves farmers without a 
viable means of recovery against either GM farmers or producers of GM 
seed,
48
 this Note argues that existing common law provides reasonable and 
 
 
 39. 7 U.S.C. § 6503. 
 40. National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Jones, supra note 6, at 626. 
 43. Id. at 639. See also Anthony Shadid, Blown Profits: Genetic Drift Affects More than 
Biology—US Farmers Stand to Lose Millions, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2001, at G1. 
 44. See Jones, supra note 6, at 639; Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right-to-
Know, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 49 (1997). 
 45. See Jones, supra note 6, at 639 (citing National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. pt. 205 subpt. B 
(2001)). While the NOP rules openly consider the many problems faced by pollen drift, including 
transfer of genetic material to organic crops, the rules provide that “such concerns are ‘outside the 
scope of [the] regulation by definition.’” Id. at 625–26 (quoting National Organic Program, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 80,548, 80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205)). 
 46. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Jones, supra note 6, at 625–26. 
 48. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 332 (stating that the coexistence of organic fields and GM 
crops is a “myth” and that organic farmers are left “without redress” after genetic drift occurs); 
Amanda Smith, Note, Sowing Wild Oats: Bystander Strict Liability in Tort Applied to Organic Farm 
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satisfactory remedies for contaminated farmers. 
B. The StarLink Case and Common Law Claims 
As most GM contamination cases in the United States have ended in 
settlements, In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation (“Starlink”) 
is significant in providing some precendent in the form of pretrial 
rulings.
49
 StarLink involved a specific strain of GM corn known as 
StarLink. From 1998 through 2000, defendant Aventis produced and 
distributed StarLink corn, which produced a protein that was toxic to 
certain insects.
50
 The EPA and FDA noted that the corn exhibited certain 
characteristics of human allergens and therefore only allowed limited 
production for animal feed.
51
 Furthermore, the agencies required physical 
segregation of the StarLink corn from other strains.
52
 Aventis failed to 
inform farmers of the EPA instructions and reports of the presence of 
StarLink in the food supply led to a wave of recalls.
53
 In the wake of these 
recalls, numerous countries stopped importing US corn.
54
 Plaintiffs then 
filed a class action suit against Aventis for damages on behalf of a 
nationwide class of corn farmers.
55
 In a ruling on the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, the district court for the Northern District of 
Illinois granted the motion in part.
56
 
The district court’s ruling contained four major holdings pertinent to 
the liability of growers and distributors of GM products. First, the court 
upheld the Economic Loss Doctrine, stating that while injuries to property 
are compensable, purely economic injuries are not.
57
 Absent physical 
 
 
Contamination by Genetically Modified Seed, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 629, 643–46 (2013) (arguing 
that common law claims available to farmers are too slow-moving to provide effective relief and 
suggesting that state legislatures develop new tests for products liability claims). 
 49. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002). While class action litigation emerged following a 2006 
contamination incident involving LibertyLink rice, the case was settled by the defendant Bayer for 
around $750 million. Andrew Harris & David Beasley, Bayer Will Pay $750 Million to Settle Gene-
Modified Rice Suits, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 1, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2011-07-01/bayer-to-pay-750-million-to-end-lawsuits-over-genetically-modified-rice. Therefore, 
while the LibertyLink outcome might suggest that producers face some liability for their GM products, 
there is no formal ruling that emerged from the incident.  
 50. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834–35. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 833. 
 56. Id. The case was eventually settled in 2003 for $110 million plus interest. Jim Paul, Deadline 
Looms for StarLink Claims, MCCOOK DAILY GAZETTE, July 29, 2003, at 3. 
 57. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 838–43. 
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injury, farmers cannot recover for the expectations of return on crop.
58
 The 
court concluded that the contamination of corn crops by the StarLink gene 
constituted injury to property. As a result, recovery was contingent on 
proving direct harm to property, which the defendant failed to prove.
59
 
Second, regarding the plaintiff’s negligence claim, the court found that due 
to the limited approval of StarLink by agencies, Aventis had a duty to 
prevent the introduction of the StarLink genes into the human food 
supply.
60
 Third, the court found that “[r]esidue from a product drifting 
across property lines presents a typical nuisance claim,” and Aventis could 
be found liable for private nuisance if it was proven that they 
“substantially contributed” to the alleged nuisance.61 Fourth, the court 
found that a commercial farmer might maintain a separate claim for public 
nuisance if the commercial farmer was “affected differently than the 
general public.”62 
Although the holding in StarLink addresses several areas of GM 
contamination, it ultimately represents unsatisfactory precedent for 
predicting recovery by organic farmers in the United States. StarLink and 
analogies to other non-GM cases are unsatisfactory because (1) the 
StarLink holding is limited by the unique position of both the defendant 
and the product in question
63
 and (2) analogies to non-GM cases contain 
elements of intent and strict negligence that do not exist in GM cases.
64
 
The holding does, however, correctly recognize the possibility of recovery 
by the defendants through a nuisance claim. Furthermore, as StarLink was 
settled out of court, this claim was never fully litigated and therefore 
provides insufficient precedent for US courts.
65
 
Several commentators have suggested that, in the wake of StarLink, 
both producers and growers of GM crops might be held liable for the 
contamination of non-GM crops, including organic-certified crops.
66
 
 
 
 58. Id. The court cited this well-established doctrine in holding that lost profits are “frequently 
speculative” and therefore not sufficient to establish a basis for recovery. Id. 
 59. Id. at 843. The court expressed doubt that the plaintiffs could successfully prove direct harm, 
but it allowed the claim to proceed. Id. This will have a great deal of importance in future suits by 
individual farmers against possible contaminators, as establishing direct harm is a necessary element 
of recovery in an action for trespass. 
 60. Id. The court chose to resolve a number of ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff, who worded 
the claim in such a way as to allege a remote duty to preserve the market price of corn by preventing 
contamination. Id. 
 61. Id. at 847.  
 62. Id. at 847–48. 
 63. See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra notes 74–92 and accompanying text.  
 65. See Paul, supra note 56, at 3. 
 66. See Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 6, at 841 (“[StarLink] although not identical to the 
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However, these same commentators acknowledged the limitations of the 
StarLink holding in establishing liability for manufacturers and growers of 
GM crops.
67
 Unlike current commercially-grown crops, StarLink was only 
approved for limited use by the USDA.
68
 These limited uses did not 
include human consumption.
69
 Additionally, Aventis did not act to 
affirmatively prevent the product from being added to the US grain 
supply.
70
 While these unique factors led the StarLink court to conclude 
that Aventis had a duty to prevent StarLink from entering the food supply, 
they are unlikely to reoccur. All GM crops on the market in the United 
States since 2000 have been approved for human consumption, with the 
exception of non-consumable GM cotton.
71
 Furthermore, Aventis was the 
producer of the GM product that caused the contamination.
72
 It is 
questionable whether this limited standard of liability could be applied to a 
defendant farmer growing a similar GM crop without the requisite 
knowledge of federal regulations and the probability of contamination.
73
 
Additionally, common law tort claims are not easily applicable to 
contamination cases. The court in StarLink declined to impose liability on 
defendants for conversion, even if they were negligently liable for “cross-
pollination and comingling,” because a conversion claim requires intent.74 
This ruling has implications beyond claims for conversion and could 
potentially prevent organic farmers from relying on other common law 
 
 
farmer-versus-farmer contamination situation . . . hint[s] at the potential for an organic farmer to 
successfully prove more than pure economic loss for pollen drift based on the concept that GM 
contamination is a form of physical injury.”); Jones, supra note 6, at 633–34; Mitchell, supra note 6, at 
324–25 (suggesting that a forward thinking court may find that the patent holder/licensee relationship 
between manufacturers and farmers may give rise to an affirmative duty to exercise control similar to 
StarLink). 
 67. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 68. The USDA required special handling procedures for StarLink corn that were not followed by 
either the defendant or most of the farmers growing the product. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Lit., 
212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834–35 (N.D. Ill. 2002).  
 69. Id. at 833–34. 
 70. Id. at 834–35. The court found that in addition to failing to follow or inform farmers of the 
USDA handling procedures, Aventis also suggested to affected farmers that EPA approval was 
imminent. Id. at 835. 
 71. Jones, supra note 6, at 634. 
 72. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 829. 
 73. Jones, supra note 6, at 634 (stating that the holding in StarLink is distinguishable from future 
cases due to the unique circumstances surrounding the limited approval of the StarLink product as well 
as the duty held by the defendants to prevent StarLink corn from entering the human food supply 
which lead to a unique situation of strict liability). But see Mitchell, supra note 6, at 324–25 
(suggesting that in the wake of StarLink, a court may find that manufacturers have an affirmative duty 
to exercise control due to a licensee relationship with farmers). 
 74. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.  
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claims for relief, such as trespass.
75
 Furthermore, commentators have 
raised questions as to the applicability of traditional negligence standards 
for organic crops, given the “sensitive” nature of organic farming.76 
Other commentators have attempted to draw comparisons between 
contamination of organic crops via pollen and seed drift and liability for 
pesticide drift; however, these comparisons remain tenuous and 
problematic.
77
 In such pesticide drift cases, unlike StarLink, courts have 
ruled that the intent element required for a claim of trespass was fulfilled 
when a farmer sprayed his land.
78
 These rulings were based in part on the 
finding that the spraying of pesticides constituted an “abnormally 
dangerous” activity.79 The intent held by a farmer spraying his land with 
pesticides to kill or affect life in that area is different from that of a farmer 
 
 
 75. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, adopted in a majority of states, clearly 
contemplates an intentional entry by a person or thing as a necessary element to establish liability for 
trespass. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965). Such an understanding is further 
supported by the presence of § 166, which establishes non-liability for accidental intrusions, even if 
the intrusion causes harm to the possessor. Id. § 166. While § 166 contains an exception for accidental 
entry by actors engaged in “abnormally dangerous activities,” the growing of GM crops currently does 
not fall into such a category. See Jones, supra note 6, at 635 n.115. Some case law suggests that it is 
enough that a trespasser intend the act which eventually produces entry. See, e.g., Phillips v. Sun Oil 
Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 250–51 (N.Y. 1954). However, it is tenuous to suggest that the act of planting 
corn in and of itself causes the wind to carry pollen or other organic matter into the field of another. 
See Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187, at 133–35 (Austl.). 
 76. “There is no strict liability for harm caused by an abnormally dangerous activity if the harm 
would not have resulted but for the abnormally sensitive character of the plaintiff's activity.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (1977). At least one author recognized that it would be 
possible for a court to find organic farming, governed by a “myriad of regulations and restrictions, to 
be an activity of ‘abnormally sensitive character.’” Mitchell, supra, note 6, at 327. This would act to 
limit the recovery of an organic farmer to the amount a conventional farmer would suffer from the 
same genetic drift. Id. As the damages sought by an individual organic farmer after a contamination 
event would likely consist of the difference between market price for organic and conventional crops, 
such a ruling could have the effect of wiping out any monetary relief. 
 77. One author relies upon a Minnesota decision, Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. 
Oil Co., 802 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), in which a defendant was found liable for damages 
occurring when pesticide spray drifted into an adjacent field owned by the plaintiff-farmer. Mitchell, 
supra note 6, at 322. This decision was later affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 
2012). 
 78. Mitchell suggests that GM contamination by pollen or seed drift fulfills both elements for 
trespass established by the Johnson case: “(1) ‘that the liquid chemicals . . . drifted, landed, and 
remained on the Johnsons' organic crops in detectable form, contaminating them,’ and (2) that the 
‘pesticide or herbicide being sprayed for agricultural purposes will [affect the composition of the 
land].’” Mitchell, supra note 6, at 322 (quoting Johnson, 802 N.W.2d at 388). This comparison is 
flawed due to the fact that pollen drift is not inherently dangerous, unlike spray drift. Therefore, the 
intent element is not waived. While a farmer spraying his crops intends for the pesticide dispersed to 
make contact and affect plants in the area, there is no analogous intent present when pollen or seeds 
move across field borders. 
 79. See, e.g., Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 220–23 (Wash. 1977) (applying a strict 
liability standard for the hazardous use of pesticides).  
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planting GM crops which later release some amount of pollen into the air 
that is blown by wind into a neighboring field. Additionally, these courts 
have required pesticide drift to occur in “discernable and consequential” 
amounts.
80
 As a minority of jurisdictions still require that a trespass 
include unlawful entries to satisfy a physical size requirement element, 
such a comparison between pesticide and pollen drift is far from 
universally applicable.
81
  
While a simple negligence claim failed to address the complex 
concerns associated with growing organic crops in the presence of GM 
crops, a private nuisance claim has the ability to address these concerns. In 
a claim for private nuisance, the court must balance the rights of both 
parties to the quiet “use and enjoyment of their land.”82 The court in 
StarLink allowed a private nuisance claim to proceed against Aventis.
83
 
This claim did not rely on the unique factors present in the Aventis case, 
but instead on the causal relationship between the actions taken by the 
defendant and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Therefore, a private 
nuisance claim might even be available to a plaintiff-farmer in a suit 
against a fellow GM-growing farmer.
84
 Some commentators have argued 
that “right-to-farm” laws create barriers for farmers wishing to bring a 
private nuisance claim.
85
 However, these laws, for the most part, codify 
existing common law, and therefore do nothing to prevent the filing of 
legitimate lawsuits.
86
  
While jurisdictions differ, a claim for private nuisance often requires a 
plaintiff to prove unreasonable interference by the defendant with the 
 
 
 80. Johnson, 802 N.W.2d at 389.  
 81. See, e.g., John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 959 A.2d 551 (Vt. 2008) (recognizing the historic 
precedent for visible entrance for trespass and the modern momentum towards allowing trespass for 
invisible particles but rejecting trespass claim on other grounds); Adams v. Cleveland-Cliff Iron Co., 
602 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that law of trespass did not cover airborne 
particulate). But see Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that airborne particulate may constitute trespass under Texas law); Kornoff v. Kingsburg 
Cotton Oil Co., 288 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1955) (en banc) (holding that near continuous dust produced by 
defendant’s cotton gin which covered plaintiff’s property in a thick coat constituted trespass to land 
which could be remedied in a court of law). 
 82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826–831 (1979). 
 83. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Lit., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847-48 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 84. See id. 
 85. Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 6, at 839-40. 
 86. There are two types of “right-to-farm” laws. One codifies the “coming to the nuisance 
defense” which exists at common law. Neil E. Harl, Biotechnology Policy: Global Economic and 
Legal Issues 21 (Jan. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/ 
~harl/BiotecnologyPolicy_California.pdf. The other prevents local governments from placing 
restrictons on farming practices. Id. Neither would create restrictions on the maintenance of a nuisance 
claim that do not already exist in most jurisdictions. 
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peaceful enjoyment and use of plaintiff’s land.87 Generally, a court 
determines unreasonableness by a balancing test which weighs the severity 
of the harm caused by the action against the interests of the actor.
88
 This 
action does not require entry or an intent element and, therefore, may be 
pursued by farmers in cases where trespass might not be available due to 
both the invisible nature of the pollen and the mindset of the farmer.
89
 
Unlike trespass, this right of action requires actual injury to the plaintiff.
90
 
However, this element would likely not prevent recovery for a farmer 
experiencing GM contamination, who presumably suffers losses from the 
depression of crop value following the contamination.
91
 Thus, the 
requirement of an actual injury should not prevent recovery unless the 
court determines that organic farming is an activity of “sensitive” nature.92  
Accordingly, both StarLink and analogies to non-GM contamination 
cases offer unsatisfactory precedent for predicting recovery by organic 
farmers in the United States. Questions remain as to whether a farmer 
experiencing GM contamination may find full recovery through US 
common law. While these questions continue to go unanswered in the 
United States, courts abroad have been forced to deal with these difficult 
issues of adequacy and the applicability of standards of care. The Supreme 
Court of Western Australia addressed these questions in Marsh v. Baxter 
 
 
 87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). 
 88.  See, e.g., Dobbs v. Wiggins, 929 N.E.2d 30, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[T]he circuit court must 
balance the harm done to the plaintiffs against the benefit caused by the defendant's use of the land and 
the suitability of the use in that particular location.”); Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 202 
(W.Va. 1989) (“Unreasonableness is determined by balancing the competing landholders’ interests.”). 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (requiring either intentional and 
unreasonable invasion or unintentional invasion but otherwise with results reasonably foreseen). See 
also Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648, 662 (Miss. 1995) (stating that “an 
actual invasion of the property in question is not required for recovery for nuisance”). But see Endres 
& Schlessinger, supra note 6, at 836–37 (describing the subtle knowledge requirement necessary for a 
nuisance claim and the difficulties that might arise in proving a defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiff’s 
organic status). 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E (1979). In order to receive monetary 
compensation or a court-ordered injunction, a plaintiff must prove unreasonable interference with the 
quiet enjoyment of land. See, e.g., Leaf River, 662 So. 2d at 648 (holding discoloration of water and 
sludge on river bank from paper mill did not support damages for public nuisance); Wernke v. Halas, 
600 N.E.2d 117, 121–22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding yard decorations that included toilet seat and 
graffiti, while vulgar and unattractive, were merely tasteless and not a nuisance). 
 91. Organic farmers facing a contamination event would likely lose the premium price captured 
by organic products. See Organic Prices, supra note 19, for a table demonstrating the premiums 
captured by organic products. The private nuisance requirement for actual interference could help to 
ensure that any suit brought was not for frivolous reasons, arguably like the Marsh case where no 
actual damages occurred besides decertification. See generally Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187 
(Austl.). Additionally, the causation element ensures that any damages were proximately caused by the 
alleged nuisance. 
 92. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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and showed that (1) common law contract and tort claims can adequately 
protect farmers, and (2) analogies to non-contamination examples are 
unnecessary and unhelpful.  
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III. MARSH V. BAXTER AND AUSTRALIAN REGULATIONS 
In May 2014, the Supreme Court of Western Australia ruled on Marsh 
v. Baxter,
93
 a case concerning contamination of an organic-certified farm 
by drifting GM material. The case provides guidance to US courts and 
commentators on how farmers experiencing GM contamination might 
successfully find a remedy through common law tort claims. Furthermore, 
the Marsh court introduces the possibility of recovery in contract law 
against certifiers for improper decertification. Australian and US law share 
many similarities regarding regulation of organic and GM produce, which 
makes the Marsh ruling useful to a US audience.
94
 Therefore, this Note 
will first briefly explore Australian regulation of organic and GM crops to 
the extent it is relevant to US law. Next, this Note will analyze the Marsh 
ruling, especially in contrast to the statutory remedies offered by critics of 
the current treatment of GM contamination cases in the United States.  
A. Australian Organic Regulation 
The regulation and certification of organic products in Australia bears a 
strong resemblance to that of the United States. Like the United States,
95
 
the Australian federal government, through the National Standard for 
Organic and Bio-Dynamic Produce (the “National Standard”), regulates 
many aspects of the food sold in Australia that is labeled “organic.”96 The 
National Standard is promulgated and enforced by the Australian 
Department of Agriculture (“ADA”).97 However, unlike the US NOP, the 
National Standard is an export standard, regulating only those crops and 
products that are sold outside of Australia.
98
 Ultimately this difference is a 
 
 
 93. [2014] WASC 187 (Plaintiffs appeal dismissed in Marsh v Baxter [2015] WASCA 169). 
 94.  See infra Part III.A. 
 95. See discussion supra Part I for a discussion of US regulation of organic foods.  
 96. See generally ORGANIC INDUS. STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION COMM., AUSTL. GOV’T 
DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER RES., NAT’L STANDARD FOR ORGANIC AND BIO-DYNAMIC PRODUCE (3.5d 
ed. 2013), available at http://www.agriculture.gov.au/export/food/organic-bio-dynamic/exporting 
[hereinafter NAT’L STANDARD]. 
 97. Organic and Bio-Dynamic Produce, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER RES., 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/food/organic-biodynamic (last updated Aug. 28, 2015). 
At the time of the contamination event in Marsh, the National Standard was enforced by the Australian 
Quarantine and Inspection Service (“AQIS”), a department of the ADA.  Since that time, AQIS was 
rebranded as the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry and then finally absorbed into 
several departments of the ADA. Marsh v Baxter [2015] WASCA 169, at 101, 101 n.59 (Austl.); Colin 
Bettles, DAFF Name Shortened, THE LAND (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://www.theland.com.au/ 
news/agriculture/agribusiness/general-news/daff-name-shortened/2672073.aspx. 
 98. NAT’L STANDARD, supra note 96, at 1. 
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minor one, as Australia exports around 60% of all farm products annually, 
giving the National Standard a wide reach.
99
 Additionally, domestically-
marketed organic products are routinely certified by private certifiers in 
accordance with the National Standard.
100
 Finally, the voluntary Australian 
Standard for Organic and Biodynamic Products, which governs domestic 
organic produce, was based primarily on the National Standard.
101
 Like the 
NOP, the National Standard establishes only a minimum standard for 
organic products.
102
 However, the National Standard sets a much higher 
bar for organic products than the NOP, banning any and all traces of 
“genetically modified organisms or their derivatives.”103 Though it 
establishes a higher standard, the National Standard also does not mandate 
automatic decertification for every instance of GM contamination.
104
 
The National Standard, like the rules promulgated in the NOP, is not 
enforced by the Australian government but by accredited third-party 
certifiers.
105
 Growers and producers, referred to in the National Standard 
as “operators,” may obtain certification from one of six organizations 
approved by the ADA.
106
 Due to the fact that the National Standard only 
 
 
 99. NAT’L FARMERS’ FED’N, NFF FARM FACTS: 2012 5 (2012), available at http://www. 
nff.org.au/farm-facts.html. Australian organic crops have a dominant presence in the eastern Asian 
market due to the fact that, unlike Europe, Japan, or the United States, the National Standard does not 
allow even trace amounts of GM products in crops or the resulting food products. See Jon Entine, ‘No 
Such Thing As GMO Contamination’ Rules Australian Court in Landmark Decision, Rebuffing 
Organic Activists, FORBES (May 28, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonentine/2014/05/ 
28/no-such-thing-as-gmo-contamination-rules-australian-court-in-landmark-decision-rebuffing-organic-
activists/. 
 100. Organic and Biodynamic Produce, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER RES., 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/food/organic-biodynamic (last updated Nov. 3, 2015). 
 101.  ROBYN NEESON, STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES, PRIMEFACT 1047, ORGANIC STANDARDS 
AND CERTIFICATION IN AUSTRALIA 1–2 (2010) available at http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0011/353297/Organic-Standards-and-certification-in-Australia.pdf. 
 102. NAT’L STANDARD, supra note 96, § 1.1. 
 103. The National Standard states: “The use of genetically modified organisms or their derivatives 
is prohibited. This includes but is not limited to, animals, seed and farm inputs such as fertilizers, soil 
conditioners, vaccines, crop production materials, food additives or processing aids.” Id. § 3.3.1. This 
is much wider language than the NOP, which only requires that growers use an “organic” process 
rather than requiring that they attain an organic (GM-free) outcome. Jones, supra note 6, at 623–24. 
However, it is questionable whether the difference in the minimum standard should be considered at 
all, due to the fact that no third-party certifier will grant certified organic status to a producer or grower 
whose products contain any trace amounts of GM contamination. See Jones, supra note 6, at 626. 
 104. NAT’L STANDARD, supra note 96, § 6.3. 
 105. Section 6 of the National Standard sets out the inspection and certification requirements for 
growers and producers of organic products. It states: “Inspection and certification is the process used 
by an approved certifying organisation to confirm the operator’s activities comply with this Standard.” 
Id. § 6(i).  
 106. Id. As of December, 2014, the organizations approved by the ADA were: AUS-QUAL Pty 
Limited, Australian Certified Organic, Bio-Dynamic Research Institute, NASAA Certified Organic, 
Organic Food Chain, and Safe Food Production Queensland. Department of Agriculture Organic 
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establishes minimum standards for organic status, these certifiers have the 
ability to supplement and even replace the guidelines offered by the 
National Standard.
107
  
Furthermore, the National Standard deals exclusively with the 
regulation of the production and labeling of organic products.
108
 The 
growing and selling of GM products in Australia is regulated by the 
Commonwealth Gene Technology Act 2000, which established the Office 
of the Gene Technology Regulator (“OGTR”).109 While the OGTR must 
consult with the ADA and other Australian Government agencies in 
approving the environmental release of a GMO, this consultation process 
hardly constitutes a sharing of the regulatory burden.
110
 In all, aside from 
establishing an absolute ban on the existence of GM elements in organic 
products, the Australian system of GM regulation and organic certification 
bears a striking resemblance to the one currently established and followed 
in the United States.
111
  
B. Marsh v. Baxter 
1. Facts and Proceedings 
Marsh, an Australian farmer, owned an organic-farming produce 
business, Eagle Rest, where he grew a variety of crops, including wheat, 
oats, spelt, and rye.
112
 In November 2008, Marsh discovered twelve 
conventional canola plants that self-planted in his fields.
113
 He pulled these 
 
 
Approved Certifying Organisations, AUSTL. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER RES., http://www.agriculture. 
gov.au/about/contactus/phone/aco (last updated Jul. 14, 2015). 
 107. “Individual certifying organizations may stipulate additional requirements to those 
detailed here. ([Judge’s] emphasis in bold).” Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187, at 54 (Austl.) 
(quoting NAT’L STANDARD, supra note 96, at 1). 
 108. See NAT’L STANDARD, supra note 96, §§ 1.1, 1.3. 
 109. Regulatory Framework in Australia, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER RES., 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/agriculture-food/biotechnology/framework (last updated Feb. 25, 2015). 
The Act differentiates between GMOs (live and viable) and GM products (dead). Id. OGTR acts to 
regulate only the use of GMOs in the Australian Commonwealth, not GM products. Id. The regulation 
of GM products is handled by a number of other regulatory agencies. Most importantly, the Food 
Standards Australia New Zealand (“FSANZ”) regulates the use of GM products in food. Id. This 
divided and somewhat scattered regulatory system bears a close resemblance to the system of US 
regulations set up under the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, in which the 
USDA, EPA, and FDA have exclusive roles in the regulation of GM products and GMOs. See supra 
Part II.A.  
 110. Regulatory Framework in Australia, supra note 109. 
 111. Compare supra Part II.A with supra Part III.A. 
 112. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187 at 7. For a depiction of the properties of the plaintiff and 
defendant farmers, see id. at 9. 
 113. Id. at 20–21. 
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plants and spoke with his neighbor, Baxter, as he believed these came 
from Baxter’s farm, Sevenoaks (the “2008 Event”).114 In both 2010 and 
2011, Marsh began to post notices around his property and in the paper 
that Eagle Rest was a “GMO free area.”115 In 2010, Baxter chose to grow 
GM canola on his property due to problems with weed infestation.
116
 On 
the suggestion of a fellow farmer, Baxter chose to swath his fields
117
 and 
cut and stack the stalks early to allow them to dry, thereby reducing loss 
from wind or rain and preventing weed infestation.
118
 During the drying of 
the swaths, approximately one hundred swaths blew from Baxter’s 
property to Marsh’s Eagle Rest, resulting in nine ‘volunteer’ plants taking 
root (the “2010 Contamination”).119 In November 2010, Marsh noticed 
these canola swaths and volunteer plants on his property and notified the 
organic certification agency, NASAA.
120
 NASAA chose to decertify a 
large part of Eagle Rest after testing concluded that the swaths and 
volunteer plants were GM canola.
121
  
 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 23–24. Marsh attempted to use these postings along with the previously discovered 
conventional canola volunteers to establish that Baxter was on notice of both the possibility of drift 
between the two fields and any lawsuit that would ensue if the drift contained GM materials. Id. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the notices stated that there was strict liability for anyone who 
might disturb the “GMO free” nature. Id. The judge found that this statement had no basis in 
Australian common or statutory law and was based on a misreading of overturned precedent. Id. at 85. 
 116. Id. at 10. Marsh chose to grow GM canola within months of the lifting of a previous ban on 
the crop in Western Australia. Id. at 10, 35. 
 117. Grain crops, including soy, must reach an optimal level of moisture before they can be 
harvested. While many farmers cure their crops by allowing them to stand in the field and harvest 
them directly with a combine, this process can be accelerated through swathing. Farmers who swath 
fields cut the stalk and allow these “swaths” to cure in the field for up to three weeks before gathering 
them for harvest. For further discussion of the swathing process, see Canola Swathing Guide, CANOLA 
COUNCIL OF CAN., http://www.canolacouncil.org/media/530966/canola_swathing_guide.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
 118. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 10. Baxter’s original decision to grow GM canola was also 
informed primarily by a desire to control weed infestation on his land that had drastically reduced crop 
yield in years past. Id. at 92-93. This fact was given great weight by the judge as establishing a rational 
pattern of behavior on Baxter’s part which contradicted the plaintiff’s claim that Baxter acted in a 
negligent or wanton manner in choosing to both grow GM canola and to swath his fields instead of 
harvesting the canola in a traditional manner. Id. at 99. 
 119. Id. at 29. For an explanation of volunteer plants, see supra note 18. 
 120. Id. at 25. 
 121. Id. at 27–28. The judge discussed a number of unique and questionable judgment calls by the 
plaintiff and certifiers in the months leading up to the decision to decertify Eagle Rest. First, Marsh 
chose to wait over four months between discovering the swaths on his land and removing them from 
the region. Id. at 25–28. NASAA guidelines went beyond the language of the National Standard, 
stating that, “[o]rganic certification shall be withdrawn where NASAA considers there is an 
unacceptable risk of contamination from GMOs or their derivatives.” Id. at 49 (quoting NAT’L ASS’N 
FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRIC., AUSTL., NASAA ORGANIC STANDARD § 3.2.9 (2004)). The judge 
concluded that the GM volunteer plants could have been quickly and easily removed at the time of 
discovery without violating any NASAA guidelines, thus preventing any further contamination of the 
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Following this decertification, Marsh filed suit, seeking approximately 
AU$84,000 and a permanent injunction against further planting of GM 
canola near his property.
122
 Marsh stated two common law claims for 
recovery: negligence and private nuisance.
123
 In pleading negligence, 
Marsh claimed Baxter owed him a duty of care to act reasonably to ensure 
that swaths were not blown from Sevenoaks to Eagle Rest and to ensure 
that Marsh did not suffer loss as a result of GM canola blowing between 
the farms.
124
 Marsh pleaded that Baxter acted unreasonably in both his 
harvesting methods and his decision to grow GM canola on the property 
adjacent to Eagle Rest.
125
 In pleading private nusiance, Marsh alleged that 
the blowing of GM swaths and seeds from Sevenoaks onto Eagle Rest 
constituted “an unlawful interference126 with the use and enjoyment of the 
land” and “was, and remains, a nuisance.”127 
2. Holding 
Judge Martin J. Kenneth, presiding over the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia, denied Marsh’s actions for damages and injunctive relief, 
finding Baxter owed no duty of care to the defendant and had caused the 
defendant no actual damage.
128
 Additionally, the judge suggested that 
 
 
property. Id. at 28. Additionally, the judge felt that the certifiers seemed to make a quick and brash 
decision to decertify the land without considering any alternative solutions after the contamination 
occurred. Id. at 144–45. 
 122. Id. at 61. The judge stated that, due to the small sum and the high expense of litigation, it 
could be assumed that the main relief sought was an injunction. Id. However, Marsh continued to 
modify the type of injunctive relief sought, moving from a permanent injunction against GM corn on 
neighboring fields to a three-kilometer break and finally a one-kilometer break, without giving any 
reasoning behind these calculations. Id. at 143. 
 123. Id. at 61. 
 124. Id. at 67. 
 125. Id. at 62. 
 126. The judge noted that while Marsh used the term “unlawful,” “no breach of any statute law 
ha[d] been contended for, let alone identified in th[e] trial.” Id. at 74. Therefore, the judge concluded 
that Marsh used the term “unlawful” in the wider sense to refer to some tortious wrong. Id. at 75. The 
judge contended that a more appropriate pleading would be that the actions of Baxter “substantial[ly] 
and unreasonabl[y]” interfered with Marsh’s enjoyment of his land. Id. This description bears a 
striking resemblance to a US common law action for private nuisance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 828 (1979). 
 127. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 73. The judge stated that the focus of this pleading was “the 
event of the movement out of Sevenoaks on the wind of GM canola swathes and specifically their 
seeds into Eagle Rest, rather than upon the mere growing of GM canola generally.” Id. at 74. In the 
judge’s view, this cured many of the defects in the pleadings made by Marsh as to the negligence 
claim, which suggested that the very act of growing GM canola on Sevenoaks in and of itself was the 
cause of the economic loss. Id. at 67–68. 
 128. Id. at 149. On appeal, the court upheld the lower court finding that there was no duty of care 
under the circumstances presented by the case. Marsh v Baxter [2015] WASCA 169, at 159 (Austl.). 
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Marsh had sued the wrong defendant.
129
 He indicated that, under the facts 
of the case, the most plausible action Marsh might succeed on would be a 
contract claim against NASAA for the improper handling of the 
decertification which followed the incursion of GM swaths.
130
 
Judge Kenneth denied Marsh’s action for damages based on common 
law negligence.
131
 In his attempt to establish the existence of a duty of 
reasonable care in the circumstances giving rise to the case, Marsh argued 
that GM canola was per se dangerous.
132
 A duty to act reasonably does 
exist under Australian law when handling or using a lethal or toxic 
substance that would cause “calamitous consequences for neighbours” 
upon escape.
133
 The judge refused to impose such a duty of care on the 
grower of a GM crop approved by the federal government and its 
regulatory bodies.
134
 Additionally, he stated that he was not convinced that 
the swathing of the field was the cause of any losses alleged by Marsh.
135
 
On this point, Marsh argued that the 2008 Event established a historical 
precondition that established the growing and swathing of canola as both 
 
 
The court then went further, stating that even if a duty existed, the court was not persuaded that “a 
reasonable person in the position of [Baxter] would have taken the precaution, for the benefit of 
[Marsh], of direct heading rather than swathing his GM canola crop in early November 2010.” Id. at 
167. 
 129. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 146. The appeals court denied Marsh’s appeal on the nuisance 
claim, finding that “the appellants could not, by putting their land to an abnormally sensitive use, 
thereby ‘unilaterally enlarge their own rights’ and impose limitations on the operations of their 
neighbors to an extent greater than would otherwise be the case.” Marsh, [2015] WASCA 169, at 177. 
 130. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 146. (“The legal cause of the economic loss was the work of 
NCO in unreasonably (erroneously, it presents) applying NASAA Standard 3.2.9.”). The appeals court 
chose not to reach final views on the construction and application of the contractual arrangements 
between NASAA and the appellants, due to the fact that NASAA was not a party to the litigation. 
Marsh, [2015] WASCA 169, at 101–02. 
 131. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 146. This finding was unsurprising, given that the judge 
characterized the negligence claim, in its entirety, as “travers[ing] into legally uncharted territory” 
compared with the private nuisance claim argument. Id. at 62. In his pleadings, Marsh specifically 
included the term “economic loss” in describing Baxter’s duty to prevent his loss. Id. at 67. The judge 
described the climate in Australia for the recoverability of a wholly economic loss as “unwelcoming.” 
Id. at 136. To this point, the judge refers to the current “conceptual problem” with a common law 
negligence action seeking to recover only financial loss, even if such loss was foreseeable. Id. at 71. 
The judge, quoting Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty. Ltd. [2002] HCA 35, 
stated, “the practical consequence of such a rule would be to impose an intolerable burden upon 
business and private activity.” Id. 
 132. Id. at 69. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. “This is not a case then, in my view, for an application by analogy of some of the earlier 
negligence duty of care cases reflecting an underlying policy in the law imposing strict controls for the 
uses of premises, where dangerous substances have been introduced, or dangerous activities are carried 
on.” Id. “These canola swathes were all physically benign. They posed no health risk or a risk of any a 
GM genetic trait transfer to any species.” Id. at 137.  
 135. Id. at 146. 
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legal and factual cause of the harm suffered in the 2010 Contamination.
136
 
The judge found that Marsh had not met the applicable standards of 
causation to sustain a common law negligence action.
137
 Instead, the judge 
concluded that the movement of GM swaths between the farms in the 
2010 Contamination was an “unexpected first-time event” and an act of 
nature.
138
 
Judge Kenneth also denied Marsh’s petition for damages based on an 
action for private nuisance.
139
 Relying on Australian common law, the 
judge examined the facts to attempt to strike a balance “between the right 
of Mr Baxter to commercially utilise his rural land against the rights of his 
neighbours, Mr and Mrs Marsh, not to be unreasonably interfered with . . . 
in their enjoyment and use of Eagle Rest.”140 In applying this balancing 
test, the judge examined a number of factors, including the extent of harm, 
the value of the defendant’s activity, the hypersensitivity (if any) of the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s land, the social value in the defendant’s activity, 
and the damage done.
141
 After examining these factors, the judge 
determined that there was no physical damage.
142
 Instead, the court held 
 
 
 136. Id. at 133.  
 137. Id. The Marsh judge cited to § 5C of the Civil Liabilities Act 2002 (WA). Id. at 134. He noted 
that § 5C requires both factual and legal causation in the case of negligence. Id. However, the judge 
found that Marsh met neither § 5C standard by refusing to find that the precondition of growing GM 
canola constituted causation simply by being a necessary element leading to the swathing, the 
stacking, the blowing, and the eventual incursion. Id.  
 138. Id. at 146. The judge concluded that the movement of swaths in the 2008 Event did nothing 
to forewarn of later incursions, as it was “non-specific and very general.” Id. Therefore, he found that 
this previous incursion did not establish a duty of care on the defendant. Id. On appeal, the court found 
that the test of reasonable foreseeability was to the risk of economic harm, not to the mode of 
transportation. Marsh v Baxter [2015] WASCA 169, at 157 (Austl.). However, the appeals court found 
that this did not change the outcome, as the risk of economic loss “was not in itself sufficient to 
generate a duty of care in these circumstances.” Id. 
 139. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 138 (“I conclude that there was no unreasonable interference 
by Mr Baxter with the Marshes’ enjoyment of Eagle Rest merely by his growing RR canola on 
Sevenoaks during 2010.”).  
 140. Id. at 139. The court relied on Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880 (Austl.) as 
quoted by the High Court of Australia in Elston v Dore (1982) 149 CLR 480 (Austl.): “A balance has 
to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes with his own, and the right of 
his neighbour not to be interfered with. It is impossible to give any precise or universal formula, but it 
may broadly be said that a useful test is perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of 
mankind living in society, or more correctly in a particular society.” Id. at 75–76. 
 141. Id. at 139–40. “In making that judgment, regard is had to a variety of factors including: the 
nature and extent of the harm or interference; the social or public interest value in the defendant’s 
activity; the hypersensitivity (if any) of the user or use of the claimant’s land; the nature of established 
uses in the locality (eg residential, industrial, rural); whether all reasonable precautions were taken to 
minimise any interference; and the type of damage suffered.” Id. (quoting S. Props. (WA) Pty. Ltd. v 
Exec. Dir. Dep’t of Conservation & Land Mgmt. [2012] WASCA 79 (Austl.)). 
 142. Id. at 140. The judge determined that any damage arose out of the contractual relationship 
between Marsh and NCO. Id. Additionally, the judge mentioned that the swaths were benign and 
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that Baxter had legitimate reasons for swathing his GM canola, and this 
method of harvesting was not a novel method.
143
 Additionally, Baxter 
made a fully informed decision to swath his lands.
144
 The judge also 
determined that the airborne incursion of swaths and seeds into Eagle Rest 
was a first time novelty that was not reasonably anticipated or expected by 
Baxter prior to the 2010 Contamination.
145
 On these facts, the judge 
concluded that there was no unreasonable interference by Baxter with 
Marsh’s enjoyment of Eagle Rest.146  
The judge also denied two actions for a permanent injunction, one 
against the growing of GM crops on Sevenoaks in a buffer zone bordering 
Eagle Rest and the other against the swathing of future crops in that 
zone.
147
 The judge commented that a permanent injunction is a remedy in 
equity and remains at the discretion of the court.
148
 Additionally, the 
Marsh decision made a special note about the haphazard and disorganized 
manner in which the plaintiff submitted his action for permanent 
injunction, including numerous edits and a distinct lack of expert 
evidence.
149
 Ultimately, these deficiencies led the judge to decline to grant 
 
 
“posed no health risk or a risk of any a GM genetic trait transfer to any species.” Id. at 137. The judge 
did mention that if the invasion was “of a physically dangerous substance such as, for instance, 
burning embers, or a pesticide or herbicide, thereby causing physical damage,” the private nuisance 
claim would be decided much differently. Id. at 144. This is very similar to US court treatment of 
pesticide overspray cases. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 143. Id. at 140. It was found that “swathing itself is not a novel or aberrant method for harvesting 
a canola crop. Indeed, on the trial evidence, swathing presents as generally the preferred method of 
harvest, albeit circumstances vary.” Id.  
 144. Id. The Marsh court determined that Baxter made the decision to swath his crops based on 
the recommendation of a local agronomist. Id. The agronomist conceded in cross-testimony that he did 
not know about Mr. Marsh’s notice to Mr. Baxter of his intent to take legal action and had he known 
this information, he might have suggested that Baxter use a different harvesting technique. Id. 
However, the court found that this possibility, along with the abnormally strong winds that led to the 
incursion of swaths into Eagle Rest, did not tip the balance in favor of Marsh and his farming 
operation. Id. at 140–41. 
 145. Id. at 141–43. As in the action for negligence, the judge found that any incursion occurring in 
the 2008 Event did not give Baxter any reasonable anticipation of the incursion that occurred in the 
2010 Contamination. Id. at 141. This is primarily due to the fact that following the 2008 Event, Marsh 
communicated that the volunteer seeds grew from the droppings of rabbits who ate the canola seeds, a 
wholly different mode of transportation. Id. The judge further found that the 2010 Contamination 
occurred as a result of unseasonably strong winds that could not have been predicted by either party. 
Id. 
 146. Id. at 139–44. 
 147. Id. at 147–49. 
 148. Id. at 147. 
 149. Id. at 147–48. The plaintiff first submitted a minute for a permanent injunction against the 
planting or swathing of GM canola within 1 km of the plaintiff’s land. Id. at 147. On the eleventh day 
of the trial, the plaintiff submitted an edited minute, narrowing the injunction to only the swathing of 
GM canola within 1 km of the plaintiff’s land. Id. Finally, the plaintiff filed a final minute asking for 
an injunction against the planting of GM canola by Baxter “within 2 km, alternatively 1.5 km, 
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a permanent injunction in the absence of any supporting empirical 
evidence.
150
 
In addition to denying all of the plaintiff’s claims for damages and his 
prayer for injunctive relief, Judge Kenneth concluded that, in his opinion, 
the damage suffered by the plaintiff occurred as a direct consequence of 
the actions taken by NCO/NASAA.
151
 While neither NCO nor NASAA 
were parties to the litigation, the conclusions reached by the judge could 
be important to future decertification cases in both Australia and the 
United States. The judge implied, to some degree, that the proper 
defendants in this case would be NCO/NASAA for their improper 
interpretation of the National Standard and the resulting decertification of 
Marsh’s fields.152 He felt that NCO “acted well beyond the scope of its 
contractual rights with the Marshes in decertifying 70% of Eagle Rest . . . 
on 29 December 2010.”153 The judge outlined a number of options that 
NCO could have pursued under both the National Standard and third-party 
standards of NASAA before decertifying the majority of Eagle Rest.
154
 
Because there was no actual damage to the land or possibility of cross-
pollination, the judge concluded that there was no legitimate contractual 
basis for NCO to decertify any portion of Eagle Rest that was exposed to 
GM materials.
155
  
IV. LESSONS FROM MARSH FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Marsh v. Baxter should stand as an example for the US judiciary to 
consider during future GM contamination cases. Importantly, it represents 
a vast improvement over the existing StarLink precedent. Unlike previous 
US cases, Marsh involved a suit brought by a single organic farmer 
against a neighboring GM farmer.
156
 For this reason, the holding in Marsh, 
while foreign, has a more direct relationship with future contamination 
proceedings in the United States than previously examined domestic cases 
 
 
alternatively 1.1 km” of the plaintiff’s land. Id. at 148. In addition to this injunction against planting, 
the plaintiff offered an injunction against the future swathing of GM canola on Baxter’s land in the 
same alternative, descending order of 2 km to 1.1 km. Id.  
 150. Id. at 149. 
 151. Id. at 144–45. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 145. 
 155. Id. The judge noted that decertifying paddocks seven to thirteen of Eagles Rest for three full 
years, regardless of use for pasture or growing crops, following such limited exposure to GM materials 
was unwarranted. Id.  
 156. Id. at 7.  
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concerning manufacturers of GM products or spray drift contamination. 
The Marsh court successfully and efficiently applied Australian common 
law remedies to a GM contamination case without special remedies or 
defenses for organic farmers. Even though the court in Marsh dismissed 
all claims on the grounds that the plaintiff-farmer suffered no actual 
damages, the theories of recovery addressed strongly suggest the 
possibility of recovery, through private nuisance or contract claims, in the 
case of actual damages resulting from GM contamination.
157
 
Therefore, US courts should take four main lessons from the Marsh 
ruling. First, Marsh stands for the proposition that a court has the ability to 
apply common law standards to a complex GM contamination case. 
Second, Marsh indicates that pollen drift contamination cases cannot be 
considered analogous to spray drift cases. Third, Marsh provides strong 
precedent for rejecting negligence claims by plaintiff organic farmers 
against defendant GM farmers. Finally, Marsh shows a possible alternate 
route of recovery for organic farmers against third-party certifying 
organizations that could help keep the damages from contamination events 
to a minimum. 
US courts should look to Marsh when deciding future GM 
contamination cases, as Marsh shows that the common law can be applied 
to farmer-vs-farmer GM contamination cases. The Marsh lawsuit emerged 
out of a dispute between two farmers,
158
 whereas the StarLink case was a 
consolidated class action between numerous farmer-plaintiffs and a 
number of large corporations.
159
 Most future contamination cases in the 
United States will likely not have the unique factors that were present in 
the StarLink case.
160
 Furthermore, Marsh provides proof that a judge can 
delve into the complex facts of a GM contamination case without specific 
legislative guidance. Detractors may point to the fact that the judge in 
Marsh chose to dismiss all claims in the case and granted no damages to 
the plaintiff.
161
 However, the judge provided a thoughtful and well-
reasoned argument for the dismissal of each claim.
162
 Furthermore, he 
 
 
 157. See id. at 139–46.  
 158. See supra 112–127 notes and accompanying text.  
 159.  See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 63–73 and accompanying text. All GM products released on the market to 
date (except for cotton) have been approved for human consumption and do not have the unique 
restrictions placed on the StarLink variety. Jones, supra note 6, at 634. There would be little to no 
negligence or strict liability for producers of GM products in the event of a contamination. This is 
evidenced by the Marsh case in which only the grower of the GM crops was sought out for liability. 
See Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 7.  
 161. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 149–50. 
 162. Id. at 138–50.  
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noted at several points where, had the circumstances been different and the 
plaintiff suffered actual harm, he would have allowed the case to proceed 
in favor of the plaintiff.
163
 Such a ruling, combined with the viability of a 
nuisance claim, suggests full recovery may be available to organic farmers 
through the common law.
164
 
Second, Marsh helps to resolve the ongoing argument in the United 
States regarding the application of precedent from judgments concerning 
the drift of pesticide spray to cases that concern GM pollen and other 
material contaminating an organic field.
165
 In dismissing the plaintiff’s 
nuisance claim, the Marsh judge described the incursion of the swaths 
onto the plaintiff’s land as a “wholly benign substance.”166 He continued 
by distinguishing these swaths from other “physically dangerous 
substances” that might cause physical damages, such as “burning embers, 
or a pesticide or herbicide.”167 The judge also indicated that the pollen 
spread by the defendant’s GM crops or the volunteers found on the 
plaintiff’s land would not be considered an inherently dangerous substance 
analogous to pesticide spray. The reasoning behind this decision was that 
the pollen could only possibly cause damage when it interacts with another 
compatible species.
168
 Therefore, pollen drift from GM crops is wholly 
unlike the drift of pesticides or herbicides, which are sprayed with the 
intent to kill certain bugs and plants, and should not be subject to any 
heightened liability. 
Third, Marsh gives US courts strong precedent for rejecting negligence 
claims in suits between organic and GM farmers. The StarLink court 
imposed heightened liability on the defendants and allowed a negligence 
claim to proceed because of the unique circumstances surrounding the 
limited approval of the StarLink product.
169
 The Marsh judge correctly 
indicated that in a case between two farmers over the contamination of an 
organic field by GM material, any successful negligence claim would 
require the court to find that a farmer was negligent in choosing to grow 
 
 
 163. The judge indicated that if there had been some sort of cross-pollination or if the plaintiff had 
been growing organic canola, then there might have been some damages for which the plaintiff could 
have sought legal remedy. Id. at 109-11. Furthermore, the judge noted that any damages from dispersal 
of seeds by volunteers into the affected fields was not caused by the contamination event but by the 
failure of the plaintiff to remove the GM volunteers. Id. 
 164. See supra notes 82–92 and accompanying text.  
 165. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 166. Marsh, [2014] WASC 187, at 144. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 47–48. 
 169. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
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and harvest GM crops.
170
 Such a finding would be extremely unlikely, 
given that all GM crops grown in the United States, with the exception of 
non-edible cotton, are regulated by the federal government and are fully 
approved for wide use and consumption.
171
 Additionally, a finding of 
negligence would unreasonably restrict a farmer’s choice of crops and 
means of harvest. Marsh suggests that weed control is a valid reason to 
grow legal GM crops and that the ability to choose a unique, but accepted, 
harvesting method should not expose a farmer to liability for 
negligence.
172
 As a result, the court in Marsh decided that such decisions 
remain in the hands of the farmers and not in the hands of a court system 
removed from the day-to-day trials of the field.
173
  
Finally, Marsh provides US courts with a precedent to both allow 
recovery for farmers facing contamination and to ensure the certifying 
decisions made by third-party certifiers are equitable. In the case of 
wrongful decertification, equity means that farmers are allowed to pursue 
third-party contract claims against certifying agencies for damages in the 
case of wrongful decertification. Unlike StarLink, Marsh explores the 
relationship between farmers and the certifying agency, including the 
actions taken in the wake of a contamination event.
174
 Both the United 
States and Australia rely on a system in which the government sets 
minimum requirements for organic certification and third-parties grant 
certification based on private requirements.
175
 Like Australia,
176
 US 
federal regulations do not require decertification in the event of limited 
contamination of organic products.
177
 Therefore, allowing contractual 
claims against third-party certifiers would hold certifiers accountable for 
their decisions in the wake of a contamination and ensure that they fairly 
and evenhandedly follow the regulations that they create. Farmers would 
have a decision to make based not only on the marketing schemes of the 
individual third-party certifiers, but also on their reputation and the 
regulations they choose to promulgate. 
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It is in the best interests of both farmers and the US organic food 
industry for a reliable and satisfactory remedy to exist for organic farmers 
who experience GM contamination. Some have argued for a legislative 
solution, while others propose imposing strict liability on those growing 
GM crops.
178
 Both arguments are unnecessary and overly restrictive on the 
farmer’s choice to grow legal and federally-regulated crops. Instead, the 
US judiciary should look to Australia’s Marsh v. Baxter as precedent for 
relying on existing common law to remedy these contamination events. In 
these situations, organic farmers can recover using claims of common law 
nuisance. This allows courts to apply a balancing test, weighing the 
plaintiff-farmer’s interests against those of the defendant.179 In a private 
nuisance claim, the court will also look into the source and type of 
contamination. Such a robust and flexible test can be effectively applied to 
the unique situations in which GM contamination cases usually arise.  
Furthermore, US courts should allow contractual claims against 
certifiers for damages following hasty decertification as a low-cost method 
of regulating third-party certifying agencies. Applying these lessons from 
Marsh allows for the efficient use of US farmland while also protecting 
organic farmers and the organic food industry. This common law approach 
would allow the legal system to continue to adapt and change with the 
introduction of new technology in a way not possible in a static statutory 
system. 
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